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Introduction
International negotiations aiming at mitigating global warming often fail.
No country has to participate in a climate agreement and all countries can renegotiate at any time, especially if governments change due to regular elections. Therefore, a self-enforcing climate agreement has to be both individually and collectively rational. * TU Braunschweig, Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Spielmannstr. 9, 38106 Braunschweig, Germany. This research project is partially funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 01UN1006A) as part of the research project "STROM -Strategic options of the automobile industry for the migration towards sustainable drivetrains in established and emergent markets".
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Collective action concerning climate policy has been analyzed by several game-theoretical contributions applying dynamic models of international environmental public good provision. Barrett (1999 Barrett ( , 2002 , Asheim et al. (2006) , Froyn and Hovi (2008) , Asheim and Holtsmark (2009) as well as Kratzsch et al. (2010) consider an infinitely repeated N -player prisoner's dilemma game, with a stage game giving each country the choice between participating in an agreement that induces an emission reduction and rejecting the agreement. All authors assume that payoffs are identical in each stage game, i.e., there is no lasting effect of a one-period emission over time.
In the context of global warming, these approaches appear appropriate if the emitted greenhouse gas possesses only a short atmospheric lifetime, as for example methane.
However, most greenhouse gases that contribute to global warming last for a long period of time (Houghten et al. 1995, p. 22) : Emissions in period t build up an atmospheric stock that depreciates slowly over time. Therefore, to treat the problem of greenhouse gas emissions properly, payoffs in each future period have to depend on all former emissions by all countries.
Full participation in a climate agreement is essential to mitigate global warming effectively. If only a subset of countries participates in an agreement while the world supply of fossil fuels remains fixed, reductions in the demand for fossil fuels will merely lower the world price of carbon and provoke non-participating countries to consume what the participating countries have saved (Sinn 2008) . The so-called "green paradox" sows seeds of doubt about the benefit of partial agreements. This paper explicitly formalizes the stock of one emitted greenhouse gas with a long lifetime like carbon dioxide. By approximating the cost of global warming depending on the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide, we can identify equilibria in the greenhouse gas stock game where all countries are willing to sign a climate agreement and reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The model
We consider a world consisting of i = 1, ..., N identical countries. The countries face a public bad that is represented by the total stock G of greenhouse gases (GHGs) beyond its natural level, normalized to 0. Let 0 < q < 1 be the share of the existing stock of GHGs that is not dissipated from the atmosphere within a period and hence still remains in the atmosphere in the following period. Each country emits g i,t units of GHGs during period t.
Following Dutta and Radner (2009) , the law of motion for the global stock of GHGs is
( 1) The costs of global warming to a country in period t depend on the total stock of GHGs and are approximated by
The costs are increasing with a higher stock of GHGs due to a costly change in the associated climatic conditions. Like Dutta and Radner (2009) years -which appears to be the more relevant time-frame due to discounting -our results can be seen as approximations of a non-linear model.
In every period of the infinitely repeated game, each country has to determine its level of GHG emissions, which is given by
where g > 0 represents the highest level of a country's GHG emissions, and 0 ≤ α i,t ≤ 1 applies. Country i can either completely avoid emissions (α i,t = 1), emit the highest level (α i,t = 0) or emit something in between.
Reducing emissions is costly, and we assume that a country's abatement costs increase with the level of emission reduction:
where the parameter c > 0 represents the costs to a country of abating g.
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One country's emission of g i,t units of GHGs in period t causes additional climate costs for every country in the amount of
where 0 < δ < 1 represents the countries' common discount factor.
In the following, we assume that each country's costs of abating g in period t exceed the climate costs to the country that are induced by the emission of g in period t:
Each single country does not internalize the climate costs imposed on all other countries but solely considers its own climate costs when determining the level of GHG emissions. Since it is more costly to reduce emissions than to handle climate change, no country will rationally reduce emissions on its own. Therefore, the Nash-equilibrium is characterized by α * = 0.
Climate negotiations
Now we consider an indefinite game of climate negotiations. We call the equilibrium with zero emissions climate agreement. Payoffs of a climate agreement are as follows: Let k be the number of countries that participate in the agreement and reduce emissions to zero. Each country saves climate costs in the amount of
If no country reduces emissions, each country's payoff equals 0. Those countries that reduce emissions to zero have to bear abatement costs in the amount of c. Their payoff equals
We assume for the number of negotiating countries N that
where the brackets symbolize the floor function which refers to the largest previous integer. From assumption (A2) follows that a global climate agreement with full participation is a Pareto improvement to the Nash equilibrium
4 Punishment 
if the weight that countries place on future payoffs is sufficiently high, i.e.
Proof Subgame perfection in period t requires that no country has an incentive to deviate from the treaty given any history τ = . . . , t − 2, t − 1. The payoffmaximizing deviation from an emission reduction obligation is to emit as much as possible. Therefore, if the following three conditions hold, the equilibrium is subgame perfect:
1. Given that all countries reduce emissions, a single country must have no incentive to emit g.
2.
A country that has to punish and therefore to emit (1 − α)g in period t must have no incentive to emit g.
3.
In a period of punishment, all N − m non-punishing countries must have no incentive to emit g.
We assume that a country that has to punish in period t does not belong to the m punishing countries in period t + 1. Condition 2 requires that
Hence, condition 2 is fulfilled if
Condition 1 requires that
Solving for the number of punishing countries leads to
which means that if condition 1 is fulfilled, condition 2 is also fulfilled.
Condition 3 requires that
which is equivalent to the constraint derived from condition 1.
The agreement must also be renegotiation-proof (Farrell and Maskin, 1989: 330-331) , i.e., in a period of punishment all m punishing countries must have no incentive to reduce collectively emissions to zero,
Then,
must hold.
To summarize, if there is a natural number m that fulfills
the climate agreement is subgame perfect and renegotiation-proof.
Let c < 2g/(1 − qδ). Then, there is only one punishing country, m = 1.
It follows that the fraction of emission reduction in a period of punishment equals
Because δ ≥δ, it holds that α m=1 ≥ 0.
By assumption (A1), c(1 − qδ)/g > 1, c(1 − qδ)/g ≥ 1 and therefore α < 1. Because 0 < q < 1 and (A1), c > g and thereforeδ > 0.
Furthermore, because c < 2g 1−q , it holds thatδ = (c − g)/(g + cq) < 1.
Corollary 1. For all 0 ≤ α < 1, 0 < g, 0 < q < 1 and 0 < δ < 1 there exists a subgame perfect and weakly renegotiation-proof equilibrium with m ∈ N punishing countries if (A1), (A2) and (17) hold. of punishing countries m ∈ N, the discount factor must be high enough in order to fulfill the three conditions for subgame perfection. Furthermore, it is capped by the condition for renegotiation-proofness. Equilibrium areas for various discount factors are disjoint: There exists at most exactly one natural number of punishing countries for a certain discount factor that fulfills (17), because provided that assumption (A1) holds,
Equilibrium areas are discontinuous in the discount factor. The discontinuity follows from the requirement that the number m that fulfills condition (17) for weakly renegotiation-proofness has to be a natural number. For some combinations of α and δ only a non-natural number fulfills (17).
As Figure 1 shows, for δ < 0.85 there is no combination of m and α that leads to an equilibrium. Furthermore, a climate agreement is the more likely, the lower the fraction α of emission reduction for punishment. A hard punishment, i.e. full emission with α = 0, enables a treaty for most discount factors. However, if there would be a treaty with a higher α, the higher α leads to lower emissions during a punishment phase and is therefore figure shows that the lower q, the more weight countries have to place on future payoffs if an agreement shall be reached. This is due to the fact that greenhouse gases with a long lifetime induce costs in all future periods as long as these gases are not dissipated, whereas short-lived greenhouse gases only induce costs for fewer periods. Furthermore, the number of countries needed in the punishment phase rises when q shrinks.
Concluding Remarks
Greenhouse gases build up a stock that influences the climate. By explicitly modeling the depreciation of emitted gases we generalize some results from models that analyze a flow of emissions. Furthermore, we identify some effects that do not occur if emissions are modeled as a flow: Treaties are easier to reach for long lasting greenhouse gases than for short living gases.
Because only a natural number of countries can punish, the areas where equilibria exist are not connected: There are parameter combinations where a treaty is possible with a low δ and a larger number of punishing countries.
However, if δ is higher an equilibrium may not be possible due to the discontinuity in the discount factor. To treat short-lived gases more countries have to emit if a punishment is necessary.
